The Ankara Declaration: A step forward or a betrayal? Somali public's perspectives

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Monday December 23, 2024

Following a year of bitter disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia over an illegal Memorandum of Understanding that Ethiopia signed with Somaliland—a self-declared state in the Northern region of Somalia—on the first day of 2024 have agreed to end their bitter dispute though a wide-range of voices of discontent and public outcry from the Somali public surrounded the agreement. This illegal MoU, which was an act of aggression and a breach of international law and legal norms, allowing Ethiopia to lease a 20km (12-mile) section of Somalia’s coastline for 50 years to establish a naval base.

In response, the Somali government unanimously condemned this controversial agreement as an act of aggression against its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Somali government sought support from global allies and regional bodies, reaffirming its commitment to protecting its territorial sovereignty. Simultaneously, domestic actors played a pivotal role in shaping narratives, ensuring that the outcry against the MoU remained a focal point of national discourse.

Somalia initially resorted to diplomatic and military support from Eritrea and Egypt to counter Ethiopia's intervention in its sovereignty. Eritrea which has maintained a hostile stance toward Ethiopia since gaining independence in 1991, while Egypt has ongoing disputes with Ethiopia over the Nile river. Egypt also aimed to court Somali support for Egypt’s position in contentious issues with Ethiopia, such as Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The GERD has been a major point of contention with Egypt since Ethiopia began its construction on the Nile River in 2011.

The diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia have escalated fears of instability and conflict in the region. The recent tensions have arisen from a combination of historical grievances and contemporary political maneuvering. While both nations share a complex legacy of territorial disputes, particularly over the Ogaden region, which has often been a flashpoint for conflict. Now, During the recent tension, Ethiopia, a troop contributor to the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), has been accused to the usage of its troops to influence Somalia's internal politics. As the ATMIS mission approaches its conclusion in December 2024, Somalia is working to exclude Ethiopia from future AUSSOM missions while including Egypt for the first time.

Somalia and Eretria also further strengthened their relations amidst the tension. Eretria supports Somalia to train Somali’s military. During the recent tension, the President of Somalia has visited Eritrea multiple times to enhance relations with his counterpart. Furthermore, the three Countries-Somalia, Eretria and Egypt has signed a trilateral agreement to strengthening their security ties in October this year in Asmara, Eretria. The leaders of Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt formalized and deepened an anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10. The summit is part of a framework that Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia were developing to counter Ethiopia. This agreement was formalized during a trilateral summit on October 10, 2024, amid rising tensions in the Horn of Africa and aims to confront perceived threats, particularly from Ethiopia.

During these tension and fear of conflict in the region, the international community was working diligently to deescalate the Somalia-Ethiopia tension. Turkey- an emerging middle power who has huge presence in the horn of Africa has voluntarily initiated a mediation between Somalia and Ethiopia. Turkey’s mediation reflected a calculated effort to leverage Turkey’s longstanding ties with both Somalia and Ethiopia. Turkey culminated in several rounds of mediation as a central player in brokering dialogue between Somalia and Ethiopia. Two of the previous meetings bore no fruit. Turkey has been mediating between the two sides since July, leading discussions aimed at resolving their differences. Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud arrived in Ankara on Wednesday, December 11, for the latest round of talks following the two earlier rounds that made little progress. This talks resulted in an agreement termed to “Ankara declaration” where the two parties agreed to leave their difference of opinion and work on constructive talks. According to the agreement text published by Türkiye, the parties agreed to "leave differences of opinion and controversial issues behind and move forward with determination in cooperation for common prosperity."

They also agreed to collaborate closely on commercial arrangements and bilateral agreements that would ensure Ethiopia's "reliable, safe, and sustainable access" to the sea "under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia." This includes the initiation of technical talks within four months, expected to conclude no later than February 2025, with the support of Türkiye.

Additionally, a recent speech by the Turkish leader, Mr. Erdogan, sparked outrage among Somalis. His address at a youth event in Erzurum has further fueled the doubts of Somalis regarding the agreement. Mr. Erdogan shared insights into the relationship between the two nations; however, his remarks have drawn criticism for what many perceive as contempt towards Somalia. The Turkish leader, who had maintained a positive public image among Somalis for the past decade, now faces questions about his reputation. Many viewed his speech as suggesting that Somalia’s sovereignty is of no concern to Turkey.

From this point, many Somalis perceived the Ankara declaration as a betrayal, leading to significant skepticism among the public, from opposition politicians to street publics. Broader discussions on the internet reveal concerns about whether the declaration genuinely reflects Somalia’s national interests or undermines its sovereignty. The statement enshrined in the communiqué by the two presidents, alongside Türkiye’s leader, was seen by many Somalis as a betrayal, highlighting several contentious issues. In contrast to the majority, a small group argues that the agreement represents a diplomatic victory, as it prevents escalation and establishes a framework for future cooperation.

Many argue that Hassan’s decision to negotiate with PM Abiy Ahmed, despite previous demands for an apology and the failure to mention Ethiopia's rescinding of the illegal MoU, reflects the fine line between flexibility in diplomacy and perceived weakness. Others point to the ambiguous nature of the communique’s language. Critics contend that the declaration’s vague wording allows for differing interpretations, particularly regarding Ethiopia’s stance on the illegal MoU. Abiy’s speech also marked controversial areas, such as characterizing the bitter dispute that has lasted almost a year as a “misunderstanding” rather than annexation, dismemberment, or violations of sovereignty. This left many Somalis shocked and more skeptical on the talks. In his speech, Abiy also justified Ethiopia’s illegal violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by framing it as an economic necessity, unlike his last year speech in which he openly and unambiguously stated that while Ethiopia wants to “get a port through peaceful means,” if that plan fails, it would not hesitate to “use force” which led him to sign an illegal memorandum of understanding with certain regional administrations in Somalia

On the other hand, the Somali president's speech seemed to many Somalis as lacking relevance to Somalia’s position in the long-standing tension. Hassan Sheikh came to the table talks while grappling with internal political losses and public pressure. Hassan, who is serving the country for his second term, is facing significant leadership challenges despite his first term, during which he managed to establish stable internal politics. Many argue that the Somali leader was ambivalent during the talks and that his decisions were motivated by a desire to escape internal and external political losses. Some people pointed out that a small win against internal leaders, followed by a crash landing, could result in political violence and pose a risk to the country's unity.

For instance, in analysis of the Ankara declaration communique made by a well-renowned Somalia political analyst pointed out Somali’s president reconciliation approach as a “Nomad diplomacy” highlighting his weak or lack of emphasis on Somalia’s critical position on issues such as sovereignty and Ethiopia’s history of aggression.

Failing to mention Ethiopia rescinding the illegal MoU seemed troublesome and betrayal to the Somalis as well as a future challenge to the talks. The publics frequently highlight fears that Somalia’s territorial claims were compromised in exchange for diplomatic gains.
Public dissatisfaction is evident on Somalia’s social media platforms and in street conversations. Posts from prominent Somali figures express concern over what they perceive as a pattern of concessions to Ethiopia under external pressure. Memes, commentary, and even satirical videos reflect widespread frustration, particularly among former politicians, youth, and stakeholders, who view the declaration as emblematic of a leadership disconnected from its people.

The Somali government now faces the dual challenge of defending the declaration on the international stage while addressing domestic discontent to rebuild trust in its leadership.

Abdirahim Mohamed is a junior researcher and blogger based in Ankara, Turkey, with a keen interest in Somali politics and international relations.

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